On Having a Hardened Reasoning Faculty

Epictetus discloses what’s wrong with him

In Epictetus’ diatribe against the Academic Skeptics (Discourses 1.5) he says,

“If a man resists truths that are all too evident, in opposing him it is not easy to find an argument by which one may cause him to change his opinion. The reason for this is neither the man’s ability nor the teacher’s weakness; nay, when a man who has been trapped in an argument hardens to stone, how shall one any longer deal with him by argument?”

One of the frustrating things in having to understand philosophies from translations is that sometimes the same word used by two different philosophers with conflicting views is translated into different words in English when in the original they were talking about the same thing, and sometimes they used different words that end up being translated as the same word. The second is the case in this quote. 

In Greek Pyrrhonist and Academic Skeptic usage, the term translated as “evident” is δηλον - a technical term meaning evident, empirical, obvious, manifest. Epictetus here is not using that term. Instead, he is talking about things that have very much been brought to light.¹ That there might be a philosophical distinction being made here was likely missed by the translator, but there is one. The term Epictetus used is broader, reflecting Stoic thinking on what counts as truth. 

One of Epicurus's important philosophical innovations was the idea of preconceptions. In our efforts to understand anything, we carry certain preconceptions about what we are perceiving based on our past experiences. The Pyrrhonists accept this Epicurean idea, noting that many preconceptions are possible (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, II.331).

One might describe Epictetus as a man of strong preconceptions - something facilitated by Stoic epistemology. Stoic epistemology can be said to be rather optimistic about our ability to attain knowledge, whereas Pyrrhonist and Academic Skeptic epistemology can be said to be much more realistic. This has been made clear from the scientific advances made in the past couple of millennia. For example, one would be hard-pressed to find these days anyone who believes in the Stoic doctrine of why divination works. Rare these days are those who believe in the Stoic doctrine of a divine and providential universe, but one at least can still find advocates for it.

So, here, Epictetus thinks he has found truth. He’s talking about trying to convince other people that he has found it, but those other people have a preconception that truth is much harder to obtain than Epictetus thinks it is. Among the reasons they think it is more difficult is that wide variations in circumstances are possible. 

The classic example of an extreme variation in circumstances that is possible is the dream argument. Perhaps the most well-known version of it is from the ancient Chinese Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi, who tells a story of a man named Zhuang Zhou who once dreamed he was a butterfly, flitting and fluttering around, happy, and doing as he pleased. As a butterfly, he did not know he was Zhuang Zhou. All of a sudden, he awoke and found he was Zhuang Zhou, solid and unmistakably human. But then he did not know whether he was Zhuang Zhou dreaming he was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuang Zhou.

Epictetus takes up this classic example,

Do your senses tell you that you are awake? ‘No,’ he answers, ‘any more than they do when in dreams I have the impression that I am awake.’ Is there, then, no difference between these two impressions? ‘None.’

This frustrates Epictetus. 

Can I argue with this man any longer? And what cautery or lancet shall I apply to him, to make him realize that he is deadened.

Epictetus is using here the common metaphor of philosophy as medicine for the soul. He likens his philosophical approach to surgery, so he’s using a surgical metaphor. 

We know a lot more about medicine than was known in Epictetus’ day, but for those who remember what happened during the Covid pandemic, there were a lot of very firm claims being made by those in positions of authority that turned out to either be wrong or far less certain than claimed. This has caused many people to question other authoritatively given medical claims. It turns out that if exposed to scrutiny even widely accepted claims in medicine are rife with exceptions, depending on the patient’s circumstances and differing views of what is valuable in those circumstances. 

Someone with preconceptions like those of Epictetus is prone to ignoring all of this in preference of becoming attached to some truth they feel is universal. And when they become attached to such a thing, they’ll declare it to be objectively true - like they have some god’s-eye view of the world, which they, in fact, do not have. Here are some examples of things one might hear claimed to be “objectively” good or bad:

• Exercise is objectively good. Nope. In many cases of injury you need to get rest instead.

• Food is objectively good. Have you seen the obesity epidemic? Food can definitely be bad for you. 

• Water is objectively good. Nope. Water is involved in every case of death by drowning. Oh, you mean only about drinking water? Excessive hydration can kill you.

• Smoking is objectively bad. Nope. Many people on antipsychotic medications find that they need the stimulus provided by smoking to help them get through the day. Sure, smoking will likely shorten their lives, but the alternative of languishing on the sofa all day is worse. Besides, people do all sorts of things that will statistically shorten their lives because they believe the benefits are worth it. Traveling by car will shorten your life. Arguably, many commonly consumed foods will shorten your life. Etc. 

The main preconception here is that universal truths are common, and many things are clearly true. Epictetus tells us he has this preconception: 

…with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is in a bad condition

Epictetus’ preconception is that he’s in a good condition. He grasps and understands lots of things. 

Or so he believes.

However, if one has this preconception, one can inductively jump from seeing many, many white swans to attachment to the “objective truth” that all swans are white. When that happens, having someone deny such  “truths that are all too evident” by pointing out that induction is fallible, circumstances can vary, and other reasons one should not think that we have much access to truth invokes the response:

Can I argue with this man any longer? And what cautery or lancet shall I apply to him, to make him realize that he is deadened.

The one who is actually deadened here is Epictetus. He’s deadened to possibility. He’s deadened to his fallibility. He’s deadened to the alternative perspectives and values of others. 

He doesn’t need cautery or a lancet to make him realize that he is deadened. He needs a purgative. He’s suffering from a preconception that’s hard to get rid of. 

An uneasy feeling of butterflies in the stomach can be a precursor to an awakening.

1. ἄν τις, φησίν, ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν λόγον, δι᾽ οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτόν.