The Faulty Foundation of Modern Stoicism

The Fundamental Failures of Epictetus’s Fundamental Rule

Epictetus’s Enchiridion opens with his interpretation of what is called in Stoicism the “Fundamental Rule” or the “Dichotomy of Control.” I say “his interpretation” because the same basic idea is found in many other competing philosophies of life. Among the ideas from ancient Stoicism that are popular among Stoics today, Epictetus’s rule, along with the idea that virtue is the only good, appear to top the list. Absent from this list is the ancient Stoic claim that divination is scientifically valid, which is now almost universally ignored.

The Fundamental Rule contains obvious common sense: some things in life you can control, but most things you cannot control. While it’s obvious when stated, somehow, many people need to have it pointed out to them. There appears to be something inherent in the human condition that leads people to believe they can control far more than they actually can. As a result, many people have benefited from adopting a narrower view of what they can control.

Epictetus, however, has a unique conception of what we can and cannot control - a conception that is as faulty and pernicious as the ancient Stoic view of divination.

Epictetus’s Rule

Here’s what Epictetus says is eph' hêmin, commonly translated as “up to us” or “within one’s power,” or “under one’s control,” or “one’s business”:

• Opinion (conception)

• Aim (choice)

• Desire

• Aversion

• Our own actions

And what is not up to us:

• Body

• Property

• Reputation

• Status

• Whatever is not our own action

Epictetus claims that the things that are up to us are by nature free, unrestricted, unhindered; and those that are not up to us are by nature weak, dependent, restricted, alien. Those are strong claims, but then he goes on to make absolutely extraordinary claims:

But if you take for your own only that which is your own, and view what belongs to others just as it really is, then no one will ever compel you, no one will restrict you, you will find fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will; no one will hurt you, you will not have an enemy, nor will you suffer any harm.

It's no wonder that so many people are drawn to Stoicism. Epictetus says it will make you invulnerable. But the Fundamental Rule cannot deliver on these promises because the rule is fundamentally flawed.

The Body Versus Epictetus

Epictetus’s rule is not logically coherent. How can your actions be under your control but not your body? How can you even exist without your body?

Epictetus takes a dualist approach here. You are not your body. Your body is external to you. Never mind that while your actions are up to you, and you cannot possibly act without your body, your body is somehow not something you possess.

That would seem to be… contentious. I, too, wish to protest.

If you aren’t your body, then what are you? In Epictetus’s view, you are your rational faculty - whatever the heck that is. What it is not, however, is some eternal soul that’s only temporarily inhabiting your body. Stoicism promises no afterlife. According to Epictetus, you are just some homunculus, some tiny mental operator perched inside your skull, using reason to push buttons on a machine it doesn’t really own.

Epictetus is clear about what his view of the body entails. He gives examples, starting with the story of Helvidius Priscus, who was executed on Vespasian's order.

This Priscus Helvidius, too, saw, and acted accordingly; for when Vespasian had sent to forbid his going to the Senate, he answered, " It is in your power to prevent my continuing a senator; but while I am one I must go." - "Well, then, at least be silent there." "Do not ask my opinion and I will be silent." -" But I must ask it." " And I must speak what appears to me to be right." - "But if you do, I will put you to death." "When did I ever tell you that I was immortal? You will do your part, and I mine; it is yours to kill, and mine to die intrepid; yours to banish, mine to depart untroubled."

What good, then, did Priscus do, who was but a single person?, Why, what good does the purple do to the garment? What, but to be beautiful in itself, and to set a good example to the rest? Another, perhaps, if in such circumstances Caesar had forbidden his going to the Senate, would have answered, " I am obliged to you for excusing me." But such a one he would not have forbidden to go, - well knowing that he would either sit like a statue, or, if he spoke, would say what he knew to be agreeable to Caesar, and would overdo it by adding still more.

Thus acted even a wrestler, who was in danger of death, unless he consented to an ignominious amputation. His brother, who was a philosopher, coming to him, and saying " Well, brother, what do you design to do? Let us cut away this part, and return again to the field." He refused, and courageously died.

When it was asked whether he acted thus as a wrestler, or a philosopher, I answer, as a man, said Epictetus; but as a man who had been proclaimed a champion at the Olympic games; who had been used to such places, and not exercised merely in the school of Bato. Another would have had his very head cut off, if he could have lived without it. This is that regard to character, so powerful with those who are accustomed to introduce it, from their own breasts, into their deliberations.

"Come now, Epictetus, take off your beard." If I am a philosopher, I answer, I will not take it off. - "Then I will take off your head." If that will do you any good, take it. (Discourses, 1.2)

Epictetus brags here about how he wouldn’t even shave off his own beard to save his life. He praises a wrestler for choosing to die from some disease of the testicles rather than being cured.

What Epictetus is doing here is glorifying commitment to abstract principles that he thinks should be valued more than life itself. Does this extreme denial of the body strike you as dogmatic? How about delusional?

If forced to choose between losing my beard or my head, I wouldn’t hesitate to choose the beard. If someone thinks less of me because of that, well, then, that’s something that’s not under my control. Meanwhile, being in possession of my own head, I’ll continue to think for myself.

But even retaining our heads, are we always capable of accessing what Epictetus calls the rational faculty? Our bodies testify to us that we are not. We sleep. We get concussions, deliriums, dementia. Our thinking is affected by drugs, stress, sleep deprivation. Whatever the rational faculty is, it is fully dependent upon the body.

Let’s turn to look at the things Epictetus thinks are under our control, such as desire and aversion. Again, Epictetus ignores the role of the body. You do not have control over your body's desire for food when it is hungry and water when it is thirsty. You do not have control over finding some things inherently repulsive, such as how many people feel about vomit, or scary, such as how many people react to snakes. You do not have control over your sexual orientation. These things come by nature with your body, which is handed down to you with its own set of basic programming about keeping itself alive.

Other desires and aversions, too, would seem to also depend at least in part on the body. Some people are introverted, and even as much as they might desire to reap benefits that accrue from extraversion, they just can’t will themselves to be that way.

While Epictetus understands that our control over our own bodies is profoundly imperfect, he overlooks the fact that our bodies have a vast amount of control over us. Epictetus’s sharp dualism here between us and our bodies does not withstand an inspection of the evidence. Whatever it is that we are and that our bodies are has a large overlap. They are not separate as Epictetus would have it.

Social Conditioning Versus Epictetus

Desires and aversions may come from sources other than the body. Some of them may be situational. Society needs various roles filled. This Epictetus understands, telling his students that they should fulfill the duties assigned to them by their society. But, beyond those roles, there would seem to be choices to be made. Why should one person desire to become a philosopher and another a plumber? Are desires like those fully under our control, as Epictetus would have it, or are our desires from a complex interaction between what our society needs and what we’re best able to do?

The Flaws of Epictetus’s Notion of the Rational Faculty

Epictetus’s claim that one’s opinions are under the control of one’s rational faculty is also suspect. Consider what happens when you encounter people who wish to change your opinions. If the rational faculty is rational, how did they end up with different opinions? How can they be so convinced by their opinions that they think they should try to change your opinions? And when they try to change your opinions, how often does anybody’s opinion get changed from two rational faculties engaging in reasoning with each other?

Not much, right?

This rational faculty that Epictetus tells us we should put so much stock in appears to be not really a rational faculty, but a rationalization faculty. We now have decades of research demonstrating rationalizing reflexes such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning.

Even our own reasoning resists our conscious control.

The Fundamental Failure of Epictetus’s Fundamental Rule

Let’s look again at that list of promises Epictetus claims will come from following his rule:

But if you take for your own only that which is your own, and view what belongs to others just as it really is, then no one will ever compel you, no one will restrict you, you will find fault with no one, you will accuse no one, you will do nothing against your will; no one will hurt you, you will not have an enemy, nor will you suffer any harm.

These cannot be fulfilled. Because you are inseparable from your body, you will continue suffering harms. People will hurt you, restrict you, and compel you, because that’s what they do to the bodies of other people. In Buddhist terms, you will continue to be subject to dukkha.

You will continue to find fault with others, just as I’ve found fault here with Epictetus. You will continue to find cause to accuse people, as I have accused Epictetus here of overselling. This is the normal course of life and common sense. People have faults that need to be talked about. Society cannot function if wrongdoers are never held accountable.

Epictetus is correct in pointing out that it is possible to reframe those experiences. It is up to us to decide how we feel about actions taken against our bodies and the faults of others. Good and bad are not objective features of reality; they are features of human judgment. That’s why following Epictetus’s rule produces positive results for people despite all of the flaws in that rule.

Be wary of extraordinary claims made by philosophers and self-help gurus. Be wary of Epictetus. His rule for attaining invulnerability cannot deliver on his promises.

It’s up to you to reject it.

Epictetus disputing with Hadrian. (1436)