Pyrrhonian Relativism

There’s no suspending of judgment about the fact that all perception is relative to the perceiver.

How one interprets the middle character in the image below depends on which frame of reference you choose. How one interprets Sextus Empiricus depends on whether one looks at the entirety of what we know about Pyrrhonism, or whether one looks at a caricature based on the first few pages of Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism.

In a recent article, I pointed out that sometimes when I’m discussing Pyrrhonism with people who already think they know what Pyrrhonism is and - always tellingly - who are not Pyrrhonists and have no experience actually practicing Pyrrhonism, I’ll point out that Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism. This often produces a flabbergasted response, “No, it isn’t! It’s a form of skepticism! Skepticism can’t also be relativism!” This is useful, as it lets me know what the problem is with their understanding. It appears that many people think relativism and skepticism are mutually exclusive. This is a big barrier to understanding and practicing Pyrrhonism. The issue deserves a more in-depth treatment as this error is widespread.

Sextus Empiricus discusses the importance of relativism to Pyrrhonism, and Pyrrhonism’s commonality with Protagorean philosophy’s employment of relativity in Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.215-217:

Protagoras thinks that man is the measure of all things; of things that are, that they are; and of things that are not, that they are not. And by "measure" he means the criterion, and by "things" he means objects or facts. So in effect he says that man is the criterion of all objects or facts; of those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not. And for this reason he posits only what appears to each person, and thus he introduces relativity. Wherefore he too seems to have something in common with the Pyrrhoneans.

Recognizing the impact of relativity on all knowledge claims is an important tool for practicing Pyrrhonism. It appears both in the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus and the Five Modes of Agrippa

The Ten Modes are credited to Aenesidemus likely because he systematized them, but the basic ideas for them predate Pyrrho. Aristotle mentions them all. They were likely discovered by the Sophist philosophers. Perhaps it was Protagoras who discovered relativity - it’s certainly the philosophical idea he is most known for.

Sextus discusses relativity as the eighth of the ten modes in Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.134-140:

The eighth mode is the one based on relativity, where we conclude that, since everything is in relation to something, we shall suspend judgment as to what things are in themselves and in their nature. …we have taken into account earlier that everything is in relation to something….

But it is also possible to prove by a special argument that everything is in relation to something…. Therefore, everything is relative.

Moreover, of things that are, some are similar and others are dissimilar, and some are equal and others are unequal; but these things are relative; therefore, everything is relative. And even the person who says that not all things are relative confirms the relativity of all things, for by the arguments he opposes to us he shows that the very relativity of all things is relative to us and not universal.

Now, when we have shown that all things are relative, the obvious result is that as concerns each external object we shall not be able to state how it is in its own nature and absolutely, but only how, in relation to something, it appears to be. It follows that we must suspend judgment about the nature of the objects.

Relativity appears again as the third mode of the Five Modes of Agrippa (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.170-177):

That all sense objects are relative is evident, for they are relative to whoever does the sensing…. Furthermore, the thought objects, too, are relative; for they are so named with respect to the people who think them….

Another ancient author who covered this point about relativity in Pyrrhonism was Aulus Gellius. Here’s what he had to say about it in Attic Nights 11.5.1:

But they say that appearances, which they call φαντασίαι [phantasia], are produced from all objects, not according to the nature of the objects themselves, but according to the condition of mind or body of those to whom those appearances come. Therefore they call absolutely all things that affect men's senses τὰ πρός τι [“things relative to something else”]. This expression means that there is nothing at all that is self-dependent or which has its own power and nature, but that absolutely all things have “reference to something else” and seem to be such as their appearance is while they are seen, and such as they are formed by our senses, to which they come, not by the things themselves, from which they have proceeded.

Another ancient author, citing the Pyrrhonist philosopher Aenesidemus, notes that “everything … is said relatively” (Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica. 14.18.11-12).

I think from this the reader should be adequately convinced that the recognition that all perception is relative to the perceiver and the thing perceived is a key idea in Pyrrhonism, and key to Pyrrhonist practice. But, while we’re at it, some of these citations address another common misunderstanding of Pyrrhonism.

One problem in dealing with some people who think they already know what Pyrrhonism is, is that they have it stuck into their minds that Pyrrhonists suspend judgment about absolutely everything. However, consider what Sextus said above.

Doesn’t he seem quite convinced that he thinks that “everything is relative” is not only a true claim, but proveably so?

For the person who thinks that Pyrrhonists must suspend judgment on everything, this presents a conundrum. Either Sextus is failing to practice Pyrrhonism, or one’s understanding of Pyrrhonism is wrong. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a lot of these people prefer the first option. They prefer to see Pyrrhonism as so incoherent that not even Sextus can pull it off. However, it’s their own thinking that’s at fault because they’ve not paid close enough attention to what Sextus has said and have instead been operating on an oversimplified caricature of Pyrrhonism - likely the same one that causes people to miss how Pyrrhonism is a form of relativism.

The reason Sextus doesn’t feel the need to suspend judgment about relativity is that he sees it as empirically and logically correct. Pyrrhonists employ suspension of judgment about all things that are non-empirical. About empirical matters, Pyrrhonists judge true and false just like everybody else does - from philosophers to people who know nothing about philosophy. For those who missed that part, here it is (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.21-23):

That we hold to the appearances is obvious from what we say about the criterion of the Skeptic Way…. by attention to which in the conduct of daily life we do some things and not others; it is of the latter that we are now speaking. Accordingly, we say that the criterion of the Skeptic Way is the appearance – in effect using that term here for the phantasia – for since this appearance lies in feeling and involuntary pathos it is not open to question. Thus nobody, I think, disputes about whether the external object appears this way or that, but rather about whether it is such as it appears to be. Holding to the appearances, then, we live without beliefs but in accord with the ordinary regimen of life….

If you want to practice Pyrrhonism, taking relativity into account is crucial. Everything you perceive is relative to you. Because of relativity, you can never have a truly objective view of anything, as you are always limited by your perspective.