In Defense of the Concept of Mind Viruses

Recently Dan Williams on his Substack Conspicuous Cognition made an audacious claim:  mind viruses do not exist and the term is not useful. 

Williams and I both write about belief, but from different angles. Williams writes about current issues and scholarship regarding belief, whereas I write about belief with respect to ancient philosophies of life. In this sense, it could be said we’re looking at the same thing, but from opposite ends of the historical timeline and for different objectives. 

From my perspective, the concept of mind viruses is useful. As Carl Jung said, “people don’t have ideas; ideas have people.” There are some particularly virulent ideas out there that have people. The term “mind virus” is useful and meaningful for referring to them.

While “mind virus” is a term of recent vintage, the idea behind it is ancient, including that part about ideas being like diseases. Most of the philosophies discussed on Ataraxia or Bust use medical metaphors that are compatible with the current usage of “mind virus.” 

So, claiming that mind viruses do not exist is tantamount to claiming that the causes of the mental afflictions that many ancient philosophies of life aimed to treat do not exist. This does not seem to be the case. 

First, a quick sample of ancient thinking on mind viruses.

Ancient Thinking On Mind Viruses

Epicureanism has its tetrapharmakos - literally four-part medicine - for curing the mind viruses that are of concern in Epicureanism. 

Don't fear god

Don't worry about death

What is good is easy to get

What is terrible is easy to endure

Epictetus describes the Stoic treatment for mind viruses.

The philosopher's school, ye men, is a surgery: you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you are not in sound health when you enter. (Discourses 3.23)

The third Zen Patriarch, Sengtsan, discusses mind viruses in the Faith Mind Sutra,

To set up what you like against what you dislike –

This is the disease of the mind:

When the deep meaning [of the Way] is not understood

Peace of mind is disturbed and nothing is gained.

Sextus Empiricus describes the Pyrrhonist treatment for mind viruses.

Because of his love of humanity the Pyrrhonist wishes to cure by argument, so far as he can, the conceit and precipitancy of the Dogmatists. Accordingly, just as the doctors who treat physical symptoms have remedies that differ in strength, and prescribe the severe ones for people with severe symptoms and milder ones for those mildly affeeted, so too the Pyrrhonist sets forth arguments differing in strength. (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 3.279-280)

Of course, the ancients didn’t use the term “mind virus,” but Sengtsan’s “disease of the mind” is pretty close. The ancient Greeks might have used the term “slave to opinion.”

So, if mind viruses do not exist, it would seem that what the ancients were talking about with regard to curing people of diseases of the mind and their slavery to opinion does not exist either.

Williams’ Argument

Williams bases his conclusion that mind viruses do not exist on three claims:

The "mind virus" metaphor assumes the truth is self-evident, so false beliefs must stem from irrationality. This neglects how people form beliefs based on different information, trusted sources, and interpretive frameworks, which means rational individuals can easily develop radically divergent worldviews.

People often embrace and spread ideas because they serve practical goals beyond truth-seeking. For example, religious, ideological, and conspiratorial narratives often serve propagandistic functions or promote people’s social interests. Such motivated reasoning looks nothing like the passive infection by “mind viruses”.

Belief systems do not spread via simple contagion. They are maintained through complex social dynamics and incentives in which members of belief-based tribes win status by enforcing, rationalising, and spreading bespoke realities.

In Defence of “Mind Viruses”

I make the following counter-claims to demonstrate that mind viruses exist and that the term is useful.

• The term does not assume that the truth is self-evident

• False beliefs do not have to stem from irrationality

• Belief systems do spread by contagion

There is no assumption that the truth is self-evident

For there to be mind viruses, the truth cannot be self-evident. People would not take up a mind virus if the truth were self-evident because that self-evident truth would prevent them from taking up the mind virus.

Mind viruses exist for things that are difficult to know the truth about. The truth may be complex, counter-intuitive, patchy, or difficult to grasp. The virtue of a mind virus is that it provides a coherent, understandable framework for understanding, and it gives the infected person a system for making decisions about something they consider to be important.

False beliefs do not have to stem from irrationality

The ancient Greek philosophers were praised for using rationality to address the suffering of the soul. However, they came to conflicting conclusions on many things. For example, the Epicureans rationally derived that pleasure was the only good, whereas the Stoics rationally derived that virtue was the only good. They cannot both be right. At least one of them holds a false belief. That false belief is a mind virus.

If the term “mind virus” had been around in antiquity, it’s easy to imagine Epictetus using it with respect to the Epicureans as he was known for showering abuse on them. (Diogenes Laertius Book 10). It’s similarly easy to imagine Colotes (an Epicurean philosopher who was known for his abusive arguments) using it too. 

Belief systems do spread by contagion

Of course, the term “virus” is not literal here. The term is simply pejoritive regarding ideas that are accused of hindering people's ability to see reality and to point out the idea's transferability from one person to another. They are like diseases.

One of Williams’ objections is about the passive contagion of mind viruses. There seems to be no reason to assume the contagion is passive. Instead, it looks quite active. I am actively trying to convince you of something. By your choosing to read what I write, you’re likely willing to be influenced by what I have to say. 

Like any other contagion, people have differing levels of susceptibility. Some people receive little to no exposure; some people are subjected to extensive exposure. Some people have habits of mind that act like antibodies, perhaps making some immune (notably one of the objectives of Pyrrhonism). Other people are readily susceptible. It’s a dynamic interplay of forces. 

Perhaps the most important thing about mind viruses being spread by contagion is that mind viruses are usually too complex for any one person to come up with on their own. They just don’t spontaneously arise. 

Polemics and Utility

While it may be true that some of those who characterize ideas they dislike as “mind viruses” do not think their own ideas are mind viruses, this does not mean their are no mind viruses. It just means that people can be blind to having a mind virus - which well may be a feature of some mind viruses. 

It also may be true that people use the term “mind virus” to refer to ideas they believe bypass rational faculties and critical thinking, versus good ideas they think are good, which spread because they are believed to have positive epistemic qualities. Just because the term is used as a pejoritive doesn’t mean it lacks value or is non-sensical. “Disease of the mind” is useful. “Slave to opinion” is useful. “Mind virus” is similarly useful. Indeed, the terms all seem to be synonyms.

All of these point out how the mind can be captured by a faulty belief - specifically a belief that takes over cognition, resists being countered by evidence, and turns the believer into a sort of slave. Such a belief is a mind virus.

May all sentient beings be free of mind viruses.