I suspect that everyone who writes about ancient Greece has some list of books that were known to have existed in antiquity but which have not come down to us. High on my list of such books is one titled Against Epictetus, written by the Academic Skeptic philosopher, Favorinus.
The physician-philosopher Galen mentions the book, saying that it was in the form of a dialog between Epictetus and Onesimus, one of Plutarch’s slaves, in which Onesimus gets the better of Epictetus.
Favorinus and Epictetus were contemporaries and fierce philosophical rivals of each other in the Imperial court. Favorinus was Plutarch’s protege. He was a friend of Fronto, who was Marcus Aurelius’ Latin tutor, and of Herodes Atticus, his Greek tutor. He’s the hero of Aulus Gelius’ book, Attic Nights. His works were an important source for Diogenes Laertius, who frequently mentions him in his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers.
Favorinus and Plutarch were wealthy aristocrats. Epictetus was an ex-slave, a debased condition that would be underscored by having him debate and lose to a slave. Speaking of slaves, Favorinus had an Indian slave - an interesting factoid about how closely connected the Roman Empire was to India. Surely it would have been easier for an Indian philosopher to get some Greek philosophy books than for a Greek philosopher to get an Indian slave.
Although Favorinus was brilliant, highly educated, charming, and wealthy, he had one big disadvantage in life: he was intersex. Although born with male genitalia, he never experienced puberty. Like a lot of Greek men of that era, he was openly bisexual.
Although Favorinus considered himself to be an Academic Skeptic, he was a great admirer of Pyrrho and the Pyrrhonian skeptics. One of his lost works was on a group of skeptical tropes now known to us as the Modes of Aenesidemus in which he improved upon the work of prior Pyrrhonists.
With all of this background information, it’s frustrating that we know so little about the contents of Against Epictetus. Galen mentions the work in his book, De Optima Doctrina. Galen objected to Favorinus’ claim that the best teaching method is that used by the Academic Skeptics: getting the students to present arguments both for and against. Galen thought that this method was sophistic and worthless. Students should be taught that which the instructor has determined is correct. Galen also accused Favorinus of inconsistency. Instead of telling his students to suspend judgment as the Pyrrhonists and early Academics did, Favorinus followed the later Academic practice of encouraging the students to choose whatever they find most convincing (this is the approach followed by fellow Academic Skeptic Cicero) while failing to provide to the students a criterion on how they should make these judgments.
In other words, part of Against Epictetus is a dispute about pedagogy, and Galen mentions this dispute in his own discussions of pedagogy. Galen sided firmly with Epictetus: that teachers should tell their students what is right and to correct their students’ errors. One should reject the technique used by Favorinus, of drawing out students’ learning through active engagement with the material.
Our picture of Epictetus comes from his student Arrian, who was keen to present Epictetus in a positive light. Our picture of Favorinus mostly comes from his student Aulus Gllius, who also aimed to present Favorinus in a positive light. The styles of the two books differ greatly. Arrian sought to replicate the experience of hearing Epictetus. Aulus Gellius strung together things he learned while studying in Athens that he thought others would find interesting. These differences can be traced back to the differences in teaching styles.
To provide a sense of what it was like in Epictetus’ classroom, here’s Epictetus expounding on how he taught philosophy:
The school of a philosopher is a surgery. You are not to go out with pleasure, but with pain; for you do not come there in health. (3.23)
Do you think that, if you do (what you are doing daily), you can be a philosopher? Do you think that you can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same way be angry and out of humour? You must watch, labour, conquer certain desires, you must depart from your kinsmen, be despised by your slave, laughed at by those who meet you, in every thing you must be in an inferior condition, as to magisterial office, in honours, in courts of justice. When you have considered all these things completely, then, if you think proper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in exchange for these things freedom from perturbations, liberty, tranquillity. If you have not considered these things, do not approach philosophy: do not act like children, at one time a philosopher, then a tax collector, then a rhetorician, then a procurator (officer) of Caesar. These things are not consistent. You must be one man either good or bad: you must either labour at your own ruling faculty or at external things: you must either labour at things within or at external things: that is, you must either occupy the place of a philosopher or that of one of the vulgar. (3.15)
Epictetus’ style is like that of some fundamentalist Christian preachers. He constantly invokes Zeus for corroboration of his claims. In the first few paragraphs of the Discourses he tells a story in which Zeus speaks directly to him.
He’s also harshly judgmental and manipulative. Arrian even praises Epictetus’ expertise in manipulating his students, saying “let those who read them know that, when Epictetus delivered them, the hearer could not avoid being affected in the way that Epictetus wished him to be.”
Aulus Gellius had the advantage of writing after the Discourses were published. We know this because he mentions them. He portrays Favorinus as widely learned, clever, and approachable. His mentions of Epictetus are all respectful.
While Arrian’s Epictetus does not mention Favorinus or his mentor Plutarch by name, it’s clear enough that he’s referring to them in his attacks on the Academics. In Discourses 2.20, Epictetus excoriates the Academics. His main points of disdain are:
He claims that Academic Skepticism destroys religious faith and piety. As Epictetus’ philosophy rests on belief in Zeus and Stoic theology, this is a major concern.
Academics are frauds and hypocrites because, despite their avowed philosophy, they follow traditional religion, even serving as priests and interpreters of oracles (e.g., Plutarch).
Academics are frauds because they claim to reject the validity of their senses while, in practice, taking their senses as valid.
One clue that Against Epictetus was published before the Discourses is this, which seems to be about Plutarch’s slave, Onesimus, who was featured in Against Epictetus.
If I were a slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him daily, I would rack him. If he said, 'Boy, throw some olive oil into the bath,' I would take pickle sauce and pour it down on his head. What is this? he would say—An appearance was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it—Here give me the barley- drink (tisane), he says—I would fill and carry him a dish of sharp sauce—Did I not ask for the barley drink? Yes, mister: this is the barley drink? Take it and smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our senses deceive us?—If I had three or four fellow—slaves of the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through passion or to change his mind. (2.20)
Epictetus here sets quite the example of the virtues that accrue from devoting oneself to Stoicism, particularly with respect to prudence, moderation, gentleness, cosmopolitan love of mankind, and freedom from disturbing passions, such as anger.
Epictetus engaged in similar treatment of others. Diogenes Laertius said Epictetus called Epicurus a preacher of effeminacy and showered abuse on him. In the Discourses he publicly heaped abuse onto one of his students because of his fancy clothes and grooming saying things such as:
Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman. Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous not to have hair; and if he has no hair, he is a monster: 'but if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what name shall we show him? I will exhibit to you a man who chooses to be a woman rather than a man. What a terrible sight! There is no man who will not wonder at such a notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made you a man? What then was it fit that nature should make all human creatures women? and what advantage in that case would you have had in being adorned? for whom would you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were women? But you are not pleased with the matter: set to work then upon the whole business. Take away—what is its name?— that which is the cause of the hairs: make yourself a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken: do not make one half man, and the other half woman. Whom do you wish to please? The women? Please them as a man. Well; but they like smooth men. Will you not hang yourself? … I intreat you by the Gods, young man: but when you have once heard these words, go away and say to yourself, 'Epictetus has not said this to me; for how could he? but some propitious God through him…. (3.1)
It seems plausible that a reason Epictetus singled out this student for such abuse is that the student was emulating the androgynous appearance of Favorinus - an intersex person who Epictus would say should be exhibited at a freak show.
See for yourself. This is believed to have been a statue of Favorinus.
Despite behavior like this, somehow, a modern self-help industry has arisen praising Epictetus and his wisdom. Epictetus may well repeat some of the wisdom of others, but the ideal in a philosophy of life such as Stoicism is to live your philosophy. Do you think that the behavior described above is worthy of emulation?
It’s a pity Against Epictitus has not come down to us, as it likely contained advice about Epictetus that would be useful for us today.
Interesting application of skeptical tropes against Epictetus. My quasi-dialectical mind can locate at least three. It's interesting that to a dogmatist these are really examples of mental sloppiness, while to a Pyrrhonist they are discursive stratagems deserving praise.
- Ad hominem attack: tell embarrassing anecdotes about a philosopher as a way of undermining their doctrine. Lather on the negative epithets as you proceed, for good measure.
- Selective emphasis, a.k.a. cherry picking: pick a few unpalatable aspects of a position and criticize the whole based on those, while (1) ignoring the possibility that those aspects, though unpalatable, may in fact be justified; and (2) ignoring the full richness of the position criticized.
- Rejection by association: since Epictetus was a theist, and he sounds at times like a fundamentalist Christian preacher, let him be anathema. Not to mention the microaggressions, triggering words and criticism he inflicts on his students. Is he a stooge of the patriarchy, a figure of toxic masculinity and/or just a resentful, crippled slave airing his frustrations on a captive audience? Take your pick.
It is worth noting that Epictetus is one of the more cynical stoics, that is, cynic tendencies are obvious in his thinking and behavior. The cynic practice of plainspeaking should be mentioned here, as that is largely what this article is about. Plainspeaking was one way for the cynics to demonstrate their scorn for social mores, while pushing their interlocutors away from social attachments and towards the good (as the cynics understood it). This practice is by no means new with them though, one only needs to remember the "sting of the torpedo fish" enacted by the Socratic dialectic in the Meno. In fact no philosophy worth its dialectical salt should shy away from the aporias brought on by words that claim to speak truth (or what the ancients called parrhesia). Or so one can argue, all the more so seeing that parrhesia was considered a duty.
Finally, isn't it remarkable that the cynics (and Epictetus along with them), having nothing but a transcendent good to lean upon, heaped scorn upon social norms that they regarded as corrupt and profane; while the Pyrrhonists, having no conception of the good, in the end lean on nothing but those same social norms, regarding them as an indispensable crutch in the practice of daily life?
Baby, bath water.